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This study examines how countries develop and 
benefit from Digital Government (DG). The literature 
proposes various conceptualizations of the value-
adding logic of DG, but the benchmarking practice is 
not responding to such proposals. For instance, the 
United Nations’ E-Government Survey combines the 
readiness and uptake indicators and fails to cover any 
impact indicators; thus, its diagnostic value is limited. 
To overcome this limitation, we introduce a new 
assessment scheme based on the DG value chain 
concept and pursue the question: how do the world 
countries add value in this chain? Reassembling the 
UN’s e-Government Survey indicators and the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, we examine 
how the 191 UN Member States converted their 
readiness into uptake and uptake into impact over the 
2014-2018 period. The results rank the countries 
concerning their performance along the DG value 
chain, identify hotspots, and calculate the value chain 
performance of regional and economic groups. 
1. Introduction  
An infamous psychometric bon mot, inspired by 
[1], suggests that intelligence is what the tests of 
intelligence measure. Regardless of how accurate this 
statement is, a person scoring high in the IQ tests is 
usually considered intelligent. Can the quality of 
countries’ Digital Government (DG) be assessed in the 
same way? Do high DG benchmark scores indicate 
high DG quality? Some state that DG is an umbrella 
concept, which means “many different things to 
different people according to one’s focus” [2, p. 186]. 
Thus measuring DG is about subscribing to a particular 
framework and adopting its success criteria, not unlike 
a tacit acceptance of an IQ test.  
However, we think that the point lies elsewhere. 
The literature puts DG at the center of a process aiming 
to create public value [3], including numerous value 
chain models, e.g., [4]. In their simplest generic form, 
such models identify the stages of readiness, uptake, 
and impact, although the terminology used could vary. 
The issue is whether sufficient value is added via 
transitions between consecutive stages of a country’s 
DG value chain. Further investigation of this issue 
leads to diagnostic questions whether this country 
succeeds in building and using its DG given its state of 
readiness, whether the usage of DG brings actual 
benefits to the country, and a practical issue of how to 
calculate answers to both questions. 
The UN E-Government Survey is arguably the 
most recognizable, global, and long-lasting Survey 
dedicated to assessing country-level DG. The Survey 
supplies two indices – E-Government Development 
Index (EGDI) and E-Participation Index (EPI), which 
triggered numerous academic studies and political 
debates. Adding to these debates, we note that both 
indices skip the logic of value addition through the DG 
value chain: EGDI combines the readiness and uptake 
indicators, and both indices fail to consider any impact 
indicators. Thus we must agree with the following 
observation: “little attention has been given to the way 
in which the effects of Digital Government policies or 
initiatives can create public value to solve societal 
problems” [5, p. 29]. Even worse – the results may be 
misinterpreted or misused. According to [6, p. 171], “it 
is always necessary to be aware of the risks of their 
[benchmarks’] politicization. Decision-makers can be 
influenced by perceptions, so it is important to ensure 
that those perceptions are correct”. From a diagnostic 
perspective, the Survey leaves two key questions 
unanswered. Is DG uptake commensurable with DG 
readiness? Does it generate enough DG impact?  
To address such questions, we constructed a new 
assessment model to capture the DG value chain’s 
logic. For simplicity, the model consists of three stages 
– readiness (R), uptake (U), and impact (I); and two 
transitions (activities) – readiness-to-uptake (R2U) and 
uptake-to-impact (U2I). Seeking a balance between 
capturing a country’s DG value chain (relevance) and 





data availability to capture this chain (feasibility), we 
realized that existing benchmarks, while not delivering 
sufficient diagnostic value on their own, could still 
provide data for the new model. With this in mind, we 
decided to represent the readiness stage by two EGDI 
components – Telecommunication Infrastructure Index 
(TII) and Human Capital Index (HCI), and the uptake 
stage by the third EGDI component – Online Service 
Index (OSI), together with EPI. We also decided to 
represent the impact stage, which is missing from the 
UN Survey, by three components of the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators [7]: Government 
Effectiveness (GE), Voice and Accountability (VA), 
and Control of Corruption (CC). Technically, multiple 
indices at each stage were joined into a single synthetic 
value R, U, and I, employing the standard statistical 
technique of Principle Component Analysis.  
The primary diagnostic outcome of this approach is 
the values of the R2U and U2I indicators, calculated by 
subtracting the values of U and R and the values of I 
and U, respectively. Concerning the years of capture, 
assuming a period between stages and in line with the 
UN and World Bank’s surveys’ availability, we took 
the value of R at 2014, U at 2016, and I at 2018. The 
population consists of 191 UN member states. 
Analyzing this data permitted ranking countries 
concerning their performance along the DG value 
chain, identifying hotspots, and calculating average 
performances of the regional and economic groupings. 
The approach proposed in this study may open up 
new diagnostic possibilities for DG evaluation and 
benchmarking. They include: quantifying countries’ 
progress along their DG value chain, verifying the 
evidence of digital performance against government 
propaganda claims, and supporting the analysis of the 
mechanisms behind global digital transformation. The 
results may help identify cases of countries and groups 
that merit closer examination concerning their progress 
along the DG value chain, including causes of their 
under-performance or over-performance. They could 
also help verify the reliability and informational value 
of existing instruments. The target audience includes 
policy-makers, public managers, analysts, researchers.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 carries out a literature review to serve as a 
background for this study. Section 3 presents the main 
research problem, along with the DG value chain 
assessment framework, as well as the data and methods 
used to address this problem. Section 4 applies this 
framework to the collected data and describes the 
findings. Section 5 carries out a discussion on the 
process and findings. Section 6 summarizes the main 
findings, outlines the limitations of this research, and 
provides future research directions.  
2. Background  
This section carries out a literature review to build 
the background for this study. We discuss the process 
logic (Section 2.1), three perspectives on DG as an 
outcome of a process (Section 2.2), as a process itself 
(Section 2.3) and as a value chain (Section 2.4), and 
the measurement of the DG value chain in general 
(Section 2.5) and with the UN Survey (Section 2.6). 
2.1. Process logic 
Defining a process as “a series of actions to achieve 
a result” or “a series of changes that happen naturally” 
[8] puts DG in the context of a process right at its 
definition. Considering a compilation of existing DG 
definitions [9], it can be easily noticed that besides the 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
component, most definitions follow the general logic 
of ICT-driven transformation. The expressions such as 
“to benefit citizens”, “to enable and improve 
efficiency” or “in the transformation of government” 
[9, p. 8] indicate that we expect changes to happen 
through some action. A similar observation applies to 
other compilations of this type, e.g. [10, p. 972].  
It should be noted that the literature introduces 
several DG-related terms that follow the process 
orientation. First, the term “e-governance” refers to the 
use of ICT “to enhance the governance process and 
support e-Democracy, e-Government, and e-Business” 
[11, p. 385] or represents a “grid of governmental and 
technological relations” for “a political plan, a vision, 
or an institutional glue” [12, p. 39]. This term is also 
explored in [13] to conclude that “each author or 
scholar has to set out his or her definition first and 
proceed from there” [13, p. 8]. Another term is 
“transformational government” [14][15], understood as 
“reengineering and e-enabling back-office processes 
and information systems to facilitate more joined-up 
and citizen-centric e-government services” [15, p. 1]. 
While the terminology used is rich, we subsequently 
confine to the term Digital Government (DG). 
How can DG be adapted to the process logic? Two 
variants stand out in reply: whether DG is considered 
an outcome of a process or a process itself. 
2.2. DG as an outcome 
The first variant is principally about DG that 
evolves. At the start of this evolution is readiness, 
generally understood as the government’s capacity and 
willingness to adopt ICT solutions [16]. The construct 
constituted the foundation of EGDI and remained its 
focus until 2008 [17], with changes in readiness 
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illustrating the process of DG development. Readiness 
is a subject of criticism from theoretical and practical 
(assessment-oriented) standpoints [16][18].  
Deeper understanding involves stage-based models, 
designed to “better understand the current situation of 
digital government in terms of results” [19, p. 408]. 
The focus is on the technical, functional, and political 
growth, referring to DG as a whole or its components, 
such as Internet portals. The process can lead from 
“cultivation” to “revolution”, from (Web) “presence” 
to “political participation”, from “online presence” to 
“digital democracy”, etc. [20]. 
This process can also be labeled “evolution”, as in 
[21], which draws a four-stage path from “digitization” 
as the primary technology stage to “contextualization” 
as the advanced policy stage. The terms used by the 
authors are somewhat confusing, e.g., transformation is 
one of the stages in the evolution model [21]. Other 
authors, e.g., [5, p. 18] apply this term to denote 
change, modernization, and innovation. Yet, others 
speak of growth or development [22].  
Regardless of the terminology used, the models 
above describe the process of DG development and 
use. Whether this process satisfies the first definition – 
a series of actions to achieve a result, or the second – a 
series of spontaneous changes, is a philosophical issue: 
to what extent the transformation can be designed, 
scheduled, and executed, and whether technological 
disruption can take control over this transformation.   
2.3. DG as a process 
The second variant is closer to the idea of this 
study. Here, the DG itself is like a business process, a 
collection of activities that produce specific outputs 
[23, p. 366]. Within this setting, one can ask: what are 
the activities, and what are the outputs?  
While DG should be developed and used as part of 
a process, this DG uptake is neither the starting point 
nor the output in itself. In line with the readiness 
construct, DG uptake requires favorable conditions on 
the ground – social, economic, technical, political. 
Concerning outputs, they logically entail the impact 
that DG is intended to create. We can then speak of at 
least two activities: turning DG conditions into DG 
uptake and turning DG uptake into DG impact.  
Management studies offer various templates for 
such models. Besides a business process, the most 
generic one is a logic model, i.e., “a roadmap or 
simplified picture that displays connections between 
resources, activities, and outcomes”, in its simplest 
form just linking inputs, outputs, and outcomes [24]. 
Here DG uptake would refer to a logic model’s output, 
and its external effects would be labeled as outcomes.  
Another example is the value chain [25], which can 
be “a powerful tool in diagnosing and explaining how 
the management of competitive advantage takes place 
within the firm” [26, p. 3]. In its original business 
context, the concept is built around such constructs as 
value (price), primary activities (e.g., logistics), and 
supporting activities (e.g., procurement) [25][26]. The 
universal feature of the value chain is value 
enhancement: “The activities that a firm performs 
become part of the value added produced from a raw 
material to its ultimate consumption” [26, p. 1].  
What should be taken as a value to enhance? The 
choice may be easy for businesses but less evident for 
DG. Generically, it can be public value, though this 
construct is “so fundamental as to be unmanageable” 
[27, p. 355]. The arguments for such a choice follow 
“Public value creation has become the expectation that 
digital government initiatives have to fulfill” [3, p. 1] 
or “Public value is intended to be the equivalent for the 
public sector of private value” [4, p. 277]. The concept 
of DG as a public value booster has taken a steady 
position within the research domain [28]. In the sequel, 
we elaborate on the logic of this enhancement.  
2.4. DG as a value chain 
The literature offers several DG-related value chain 
models, though different motivations and inconsistent 
terminologies make the landscape far from coherent.  
Heeks proposes a comprehensive conceptualization 
of the DG value chain, organized into precursors, 
strategy, inputs, development, intermediates, adoption, 
use, outputs, impacts, and outcomes [4]. They form the 
“higher-order stages” of readiness, availability, uptake, 
and impact, also indicated in [29]. This model can be 
compared to an early elaboration [30], which proposes 
a more business-oriented chain. Heeks is also engaged 
in the construction of the ICT for Development 
(ICT4D) project framework [31], based on the value 
chain structurally similar to the one discussed above, 
although with outcomes preceding impacts [31, p. 3]. 
A slightly simpler variant is proposed in [32], treating 
hope as the primary input and incentive.  
Although not labeled as a value chain explicitly, an 
interesting model is introduced in [33]. The model 
captures the transformation logic, from transformation 
reasons, objects, and processes, to outputs, outcomes, 
and impacts. Value creation is among the identified 
impacts in this model [33, p. 9]. 
Despite all terminological and conceptual diversity, 
for simplicity, we now associate this kind of general 
process logic with a DG value chain.  
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2.5. Measuring DG value chain 
Most of the models above provide a comprehensive 
explanation of the value creation through DG, but to 
transfer them to the realm of practical measurement, 
assessment, and benchmarking is still an open problem. 
In that sense, theory overtakes practice.  
While [4] provides an extensive set of suggestions 
on how to refer to the structure of the chain in the 
design of new benchmarks, it also indicates challenges: 
“benchmarking tends to focus on the core of the value 
chain – intermediates, adoption, and use – rather than 
the main upstream (precursors, inputs) or downstream 
(impacts, outcomes, to some degree outputs) elements” 
and benchmarking is limited in “understanding the 
value of e-Government” [4, p. 267].  
A similar problem is identified in [5]: “suitable 
evaluation indicators for the assessment of the success 
of Digital Government policies and initiatives are 
lacking” and “little attention has been given to the way 
in which the effects of Digital Government policies or 
initiatives can create public value to solve societal 
problems” [5, p. 29]. Deducting from [29], while early 
stages of the value chain are relatively well-covered by 
the global or country-level benchmarks, local and 
transient benchmarks mostly dominate later stages.   
A different reflection can be found in [6]. Although 
the author supplies a list of potential elements to be 
measured, corresponding to the chain logic, e.g., 
inputs, outputs, effectiveness, and impacts, he also 
states that “Benchmarks should … be targeted to 
answer specific and narrow questions” [6, p. 171].  
Even if there were widely available benchmarks 
that precisely capture each stage performance, they 
would say little on their own about the state of the 
chain as a logical sequence of value-creating steps. 
Given this, some studies confront digital assessment 
with external measures, examining how DG affects, 
e.g., corruption [34] or effectiveness [35], or how DG 
quality is predetermined by the type of political regime 
[36]. However, such efforts are oriented towards 
exploring the characteristics of DG itself without 
focusing on the performance of individual countries.  
Some studies also apply a more holistic approach, 
such as: balancing a country’s DG performance with 
its expected governance impact [37] – one of few 
globally scoped studies; monitoring the whole DG 
system in Belgium [38]; or monitoring and measuring 
“the public value of ICT interventions” in Italy [39].  
2.6. Measuring DG value chain with EGDI 
Designing and implementing a comprehensive DG 
benchmark is a massive technical and organizational 
endeavor. Thus, when speaking of globally-scoped 
country-level DG benchmarks, academics and analysts 
are left with few instruments [40, p. 387][41, pp. 4–5]. 
Among them, EGDI and EPI supplied within the UN’s 
E-Government Survey [17] cover the broadest scope in 
terms of geographic coverage (193 countries in 2018) 
and regularity (biennial editions from 2003 to 2020).  
However, these most recognizable indices are also 
intensively criticized [42, p. 68]; a compilation of the 
critique would fill a paper by itself. For this study, we 
should note that the technical construction of the index 
[17, pp. 199–200] leads to a mixture of measures that 
refer to different stages of the DG value chain. 
Mukamurenzi et al. notice that “EGDI mixes e-
government development with general development in 
a way that on the one hand is reasonable as both 
technical infrastructure and literacy are prerequisites 
for use of e-government services, on the other hand, 
makes it difficult to discern the e-government 
component in development” [43, p. 127], while 
according to [44, p. 69], “since HCI is a component of 
EGDI, this component may artificially make EGDI to 
have higher value than the reality”.  
The problems with EGDI can also be explained 
through the theory of measurement, which offers two 
basic measurement models [45, p. 103]. In the 
reflective model, individual indicators reflect an 
underlying construct, e.g., the DG value chain. In the 
formative model, the construct’s meaning is 
determined by selecting particular indicators [45]. 
EGDI is based on the formative model. Even the 
Survey’s designers are not exactly convinced what this 
composite measure is meant to illustrate [17] – 
readiness, maturity, development? The framework also 
remains technically much the same from the beginning, 
even though its authors declare updating it “to reflect 
new trends in e-government” [17, p. xx].  
Consequently, the relevance of the conclusions 
built solely upon the results of the existing benchmarks 
is moot. Numerous studies suggest keeping distance 
from these values, which do not guarantee reliable 
diagnostic insights, even if nominally correct. For 
example, there are significant dissonances between DG 
scores and the quality of real governance [37]: “any 
country, no matter how undemocratic, can score high 
on eParticipation” [46, p. 32]; or “autocracies do not 
perform worse in later UN editions” [36, p. 276].  
Reliable DG evaluation is key to countries that 
devote public funds to developing and promoting their 
DG and its use. According to [5, p. 29], “measuring 
and evaluating effects of digital government initiatives 
… is of great strategic importance for any public sector 
organization”. Referring to the value chain to carry out 
reflective measurement of the DG process may help 
separate useful insights from politically-inspired or 
technologically-driven information noise. 
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3. Methodology   
This section presents a research approach adopted 
to address the central research problem: how do the 
world countries add value through the DG value chain? 
To answer this question, we had to consider existing 
theoretical models for value creation and the scarcity 
of international instruments to measure such value 
creation. Hence, we designed a custom conceptual 
model to balance what is and what should be.  
In the rest of this section, we present the DG value 
chain’s conceptual model in Section 3.1, gathering and 
processing data to populate this model in Sections 3.2 
and 3.3 respectively, the validity of the model in 
Section 3.4, and research questions in Section 3.5. 
3.1. Conceptual model  
Before constructing the model, we adopted some 
conceptual and technical assumptions. First, to focus 
on the value changes along the DG value chain rather 
than on the values produced at different stages of the 
chain. Second, as value creation takes time, to examine 
value changes within a period. Third, to base the model 
on the UN Survey as the most recognizable and steady 
DG benchmarking project. Fourth, to relate DG’s 
impact with improvements in public governance, 
arguably associated with many benefits of DG.  
Due to the level of abstraction and the complexity 
of interactions, quantifying and measuring the value 
chain is nontrivial. Certain propositions emerge 
[47][48], often tied to a sectoral context. Also, there is 
no single model for the DG value chain. While a path 
from readiness to impact is repetitive, different terms 
and explanations emerge at implementation. Given the 
central position of DG development and use (uptake) 
and the assumption that there should be at least one 
stage preceding and one following DG uptake, we 
propose a simplified model as a compromise between 
the logic of the DG value creation and the offer of 
global benchmarks. Its stages are described in Table 1. 
Table 1. Stages of the DG value chain model [4] 
Stage Description 
Readiness (R) Fundamental preconditions of DG, 
associated with precursors or inputs 
Uptake (U) Mechanisms and use of DG, corresponding 
to intermediates or outputs  
Impact (I) Governance benefits supported by DG, 
corresponding to impacts and outcomes  
 
Most DG value chain conceptualizations only refer 
to the concept of stages, e.g., development is one of the 
stages in [4, p. 269]. However, as commented earlier, 
capturing a country’s state of DG in concrete stages 
without referring to the state of DG in other stages says 
nothing about the value created by DG. The latter is 
about relationships between stages. The clue of our 
approach is to examine the transitions in the DG value 
chain, not the stages of this chain. In other words, to 
estimate the scale of value addition, we focus on the 
differences between stages. To this end, we define two 
transitions between consecutive stages, as in Table 2: 
R2U between and R and U and U2I between U and I.  
Table 2. Transitions in the DG value chain model 
Transition Description 
R2U Turning DG readiness into DG uptake 
U2I Turning DG uptake into DG impact 
3.2. Data  
To calculate the values of the R and U stages in the 
DG value chain of a country, we use the UN Survey’s 
constituent indicators. To calculate R, we apply the 
Telecommunication Infrastructure Index (TII) and the 
Human Capital Index (HCI) that represent the 
country’s digital infrastructure and human capacity. To 
calculate U, we use the Online Service Index (OSI) 
that represents online public services and the e-
Participation Index (EPI) that describes interactions 
between government and citizens in this country [17].  
As the I stage is not captured by any of the UN 
Survey’s indicators, we refer to three World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators instead [7] – 
Government Effectiveness, Voice and Accountability, 
and Control of Corruption. We associate them with 
those aspects of governance that are expected to 
benefit from digitalization, regarding both the 
normative standpoints, e.g. [9], and the major trends in 
the analytical studies, e.g. [34][35][49]. 
As the literature does not define how much time a 
single value addition takes, we took the span between 
two consecutive editions of the UN Survey – two years 
– as our time unit. Thus the latest R data comes from 
2014, U from 2016, and I from 2018. The objects 
under examination were all UN member states 
represented in the Survey. However, we eliminated 
Monaco and San Marino, for which some values of the 
WGI indicators were missing, retaining 191 countries.  
To consider the DG value chain performance of 
groups of countries, not only individual ones, and thus 
capture possible macro-trends, we included some data 
external to the DG value chain. Such data includes 
REGION – geographical context and the countries’ 
regional assignments [50], and INCOME – economic 
context and the countries’ income group assignment 
[51]. For further comparison, we also reached to the 
original values of EGDI. All three variables were taken 
in the middle year – 2016. The variables are in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Original indicators used in the research 
Stage Measure Scale Source 
R 
Human Capital Index (HCI) 
0 to 1 [52] 
Telecom Infrastructure Index (TII) 
U 
Online Service Index (OSI) 
0 to 1 [52] 
E-Participation Index (EPI) 
I 
Government Effectiveness (GE) 
z-score (0,1) [53] Voice and Accountability (VA) 
Control of Corruption (CC) 
 
Region (REGION) 17 regions [50] 
Income group (INCOME) 4 levels [51] 
E-Gov. Development Index (EGDI) 0 to 1 [52] 
3.3. Data processing 
Data processing involves replacing constituent 
indicators like, e.g., HCI and TII with the single one – 
R representing a stage in the DG value chain. As a 
stage is a well-defined construct within a chain, we 
expected high correlations between the indicators at 
each stage. As the model is reflective, we also hope 
that a different but still relevant to the central concept 
set of indicators would also support the underlying 
constructs and reveal relatively high correlations. 
 To calculate three synthetic indicators for R, U, 
and I, each quantifying different stages of the chain in 
a year, we applied the Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) method. PCA reduces “the dimensionality of a 
data set … while retaining as much as possible of the 
variation present in the data set” [54, p. 1]. See the 
factor approach to EGDI in [42]. We determined the 
number of components to retain using eigenvalue 
greater than 1 (Kaiser rule) and at least 80% variance 
explained [54, pp. 111–149].  
We name the resulting indicators, which capture the 
values of the DG value chain’s respective stages and 
transitions: iR, iU, iI, iR2U, and iU2I. In order to 
preserve comparability in terms of the central tendency 
and variance, the z-score standardization procedure 
was applied. So, iR, iU, and iI are the standardized first 
components of R, U, and I. The indicators of R2U and 
U2I – iR2U and iU2I – are the standardized differences 
between iU and iR, and between iI and iU.  
Due to the descriptive character of value addition, 
lacking one established quantification method, we 
associate value addition with value change between 
two consecutive stages. As standardized indicators 
represent these values, they refer to a country’s relative 
position on a scale rather than an external determinant 
of quality. Given the standardized forms of iR2U and 
iU2I, if one of them exceeds 1, we say that the DG 
value chain produces an R2U (U2I) surplus. If one of 
them is less than -1, then it produces R2U (U2I) 
deficit. Otherwise, the DG value chain is normal. The 
combination of surplus, deficit, and normal values of 
R2U and U2I summarizes the state of the chain.  
3.4. Model validity  
The validity relies on the logical interpretation of 
the literature and two verifying questions. 
First, do aggregated data support the constructs 
behind R, U, and I? The high positive correlations 
between the original indicators in the respective stages 
and the positive results of the PCA method application 
(“in a reflective view, the first principal component is 
the best solution” [45, p. 106]) at each stage permit us 
to answer this question affirmatively. 
Second, does the order of stages allow us to expect 
a causal path? Heeks notices that “the causal path from 
e-Government to outcomes is too indistinct”, but also 
suggests that “it may be worth undertaking some 
exploratory correlations to see if any patterns emerge” 
[4, p. 272]. Our model is simplified, thus not meant to 
explain the values at one stage by those at previous 
stages. Nonetheless, the high positive correlations 
between the values of R and U (0.76) and U and I 
(0.65) support the concept of a logical pattern. 
3.5. Research questions 
We can finally decompose the general research 
problem into three questions: 1) Which countries are 
the best and worst in iR2U and iU2I? 2) What are the 
average values of iR2U and iU2I in the geographic and 
economic groupings? 3) How do the values of iR2U 
and iU2I correspond to the values of EGDI?  
4. Findings 
Table 4 depicts basic descriptive statistics for the 
input dataset. Some elements are worth noticing: 
moderate skewness of HCI (negative), and TI and CC 
(positive); the platykurtic character of the distributions, 
especially for OSI and EPI; and GE, VA, and CC not 
revealing averages equal to 0 and standard deviation to 
1, because they are a subset of the original dataset.   
Table 4. Original dataset – descriptive statistics 
  Mean Med. St. dev. Skew. Kurt. 
HCI 0.65 0.71 0.20 -0.74 -0.09 
TI 0.36 0.31 0.25 0.52 -0.82 
OSI 0.46 0.46 0.27 0.10 -1.10 
EPI 0.47 0.49 0.27 0.05 -1.07 
GE -0.08 -0.21 0.99 0.24 -0.39 
VA -0.04 0.04 1.00 -0.21 -0.95 
CC -0.08 -0.25 0.99 0.61 -0.31 
 
Using the standard “boxplot” technique [55], we 
identified just one outlier in the entire dataset – South 
Sudan with 0.00 HCI in 2014. Considering its marginal 
impact on further calculations, we retained this case. 
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In line with our assumptions, within a single stage, 
all pairs are strongly and positively correlated. For R, 
the correlation coefficient between HCI and TI is 0.80; 
for U, the correlation between OSI and EPI is 0.97; for 
I,  the correlation between GE and VA is 0.71, between 
GE and CC, is 0.91, and between VA and CC is 0.78.  
Table 5 presents standard deviations and share of 
variance for the first components, computed for each 
stage. In line with our assumptions, each component 
has an eigenvalue (the square of standard deviation) 
bigger than one and explains over 80% of the original 
variance. Thus, they provide a good summary of the 
original data. For R and U, both component loadings 
are 0.71. For I, they are: GE 0.58, VA 0.55, CC 0.60.  
Table 5. First Principal Components for the stages 
Stage Standard deviation Share of variance 
R 1.34 0.90 
U 1.40 0.99 
I 1.61 0.87 
 
Here are the top and bottom countries considering 
the values of iR, iU, and iI. Countries with the highest 
value of iR are South Korea (1.95), Australia (1.84), 
and Iceland (1.75), with the lowest are Somalia (-2.42), 
Niger (-2.09), and Burkina Faso (-1.90). Countries with 
the highest value of iU are the United Kingdom (1.99), 
Australia (1.91), and South Korea (1.82), with the 
lowest, the Central African Republic (-1.72), Djibouti  
(-1.69), and Tuvalu (-1.69). Countries with the highest 
values of iI are Finland (2.18), Norway (2.14), and 
Switzerland (2.13), with the lowest are South Sudan   
(-2.15), Somalia (-2.03), and Yemen (-1.96).  
Table 6 lists five the most and five the least 
successful countries in turning DG readiness into DG 
uptake. The most successful are India (2.92), Ethiopia 
(2.63), and Morocco (2.43). The least successful are 
Antigua and Barbuda (-2.68), Palau (-2.66), and Libya 
(-2.30). Remarkably, half of the ten least successful 
countries are Small Island Developing States (SIDS).  
Table 6. iR2U – 5 top and bottom countries 
Top 5 Bottom 5 
Country iR2U Country iR2U 
India 2.92 Antigua and Barbuda -2.68 
Ethiopia 2.63 Palau -2.66 
Morocco 2.43 Libya -2.30 
Bangladesh 2.41 Saint Kitts and Nevis -2.12 
Tanzania 2.24 Tuvalu -2.05 
 
Table 7 lists five the most and five the least 
successful countries in turning DG uptake into DG 
impact. The most successful are Tuvalu (2.28), 
Micronesia (2.06), and Palau (2.06); the least are 
Uzbekistan (-2.27), Mexico (-2.14), and Russia (-1.97). 
Remarkably, four out of the five most successful 
countries in turning DG uptake into DG impact are 
SIDS. An interesting pattern emerges here: successful 
governance with little contribution from DG. On the 
other side, a group of countries like Morocco, Mexico, 
and China, which all successfully turned DG readiness 
into uptake, cannot turn DG uptake into impact. 
Table 7. iU2I – 5 top and bottom countries 
Top 5 Bottom 5 
Country iU2I Country iU2I 
Tuvalu 2.28 Uzbekistan -2.27 
Micronesia 2.06 Mexico -2.14 
Palau 2.06 Russia -1.97 
Switzerland 1.99 Bahrain -1.91 
Andorra 1.88 Azerbaijan -1.89 
 
The overall state of the DG value chain comprises: 
101 countries produce normal iR2U and iU2I, 17 
produce normal iR2U and deficit iU2I, 16 produce 
normal iR2U and surplus iU2I, 16 produce deficit 
iR2U and normal iU2I, 14 produce deficit iR2U and 
surplus iU2I, 12 produce surplus iR2U and normal 
iU2I, and 15 produce surplus iR2U and deficit iU2I. 
Statistical construction impacts this distribution.  
It is also worth listing the countries where the 
advantage of iR2U over iU2I (left part of Table 8) or of 
iU2I over iR2U (right part of Table 8) is exceptionally 
high. Countries like Morocco or Mexico successfully 
developed DG but failed in creating good governance. 
On the other side, SIDS like Palau or Antigua achieve 
good governance despite low DG uptake.  
Table 8. Highest differences between iR2U and iU2I 
Country iR2U-iU2I Country iU2I-iR2U 
Morocco 4.22 Palau 4.71 
Mexico 4.11 Antigua and Barbuda 4.43 
India 3.93 Tuvalu 4.33 
Bangladesh 3.85 Saint Kitts and Nevis 3.85 
Ethiopia 3.70 Barbados 3.54 
 
Turning to the regional analysis, Table 9 presents 
the most and the least successful regions in turning DG 
readiness into DG uptake using the average values of 
iR2U for those regions. Southern Asia is the most, and 
Micronesia and Polynesia are the least successful 
regions in that respect.  
Table 9. iR2U (average) – 5 top and 5 bottom subregions 
Top 5 Bottom 5 
Region iR2U Region iR2U 
Southern Asia 1.02 Micronesia -1.35 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.35 Polynesia -1.23 
Northern America 0.34 Central Asia -0.52 
South-eastern Asia 0.17 Western Europe -0.47 
Western Asia 0.17 Northern Europe -0.44 
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Table 10 captures regional success in turning DG 
uptake into DG impact. The most successful regions 
are Micronesia, Polynesia, and Melanesia; the least 
successful are Central, Western, and Eastern Asia.  
Table 10. iU2I (average) – top and bottom 5 subregions 
Top 5 Bottom 5 
Region iU2I Region iU2I 
Micronesia 1.85 Central Asia -1.06 
Polynesia 1.54 Western Asia -0.82 
Melanesia 0.98 Eastern Asia -0.80 
Western Europe 0.84 Northern Africa -0.70 
Northern Europe 0.57 Eastern Europe -0.50 
 
Concerning the economic analysis, Table 11 
depicts the average values of iR2U and iU2I for four 
income groups. For iR2U, the lower the income, the 
higher iR2U. As high-income countries have high R-
value already, this is unsurprising. For iU2I, the low-
income group turns DG uptake into DG impact better 
than the lower-middle- or upper-middle-income group 
but worse than the high-income group.   
Table 11. iR2U and iU2I (average) for income groups 
Income group iR2U iU2I 
High -0.39 0.32 
Upper-middle -0.32 -0.11 
Lower-middle 0.37 -0.20 
Low 0.63 -0.03 
 
Finally, consider the relationship with EGDI. The 
correlation between EGDI (2016) and iR2U or iU2I is 
negligible – Pearson coefficients are 0.06 and -0.16, 
respectively. Thus, EGDI says little about the DG 
value chain. Given the thresholds in the UN survey 
(0.25, 0.5, 0.75), Table 12 depicts the average values of 
iR2U and iU2I for the four groups. Note that low-
EGDI countries turn their low DG readiness into good 
DG uptake and further into DG impact, while high-
EGDI countries fail to turn DG uptake into DG impact. 
The middle-EGDI group is better in turning DG uptake 
into impact than in turning DG readiness into uptake.  
Table 12. iR2U and iU2I (average) for EGDI groups 
EGDI group iR2U iU2I 
Very High -0.09 0.15 
High 0.07 -0.43 
Middle -0.16 0.23 
Low 0.28 0.29 
5. Discussion  
The highlight of our approach to assessing value 
addition through DG is to examine differences between 
stages in the DG value chain. While the chain is 
variably described in the literature, we managed to 
utilize the existing benchmarks and propose a simple 
measurement model that follows the logical path from 
DG readiness to DG uptake to DG impact. Our model 
offers a viable path to a comprehensive and 
diagnostically useful scheme of DG assessment. 
The research results reveal several facts that are 
hidden from traditional indicators. First, the patterns of 
DG value addition strongly vary. A group of countries 
like China, Mexico, or Morocco can turn DG readiness 
into DG uptake and fail to turn DG uptake into DG 
impact. A group of countries, including Palau, Antigua, 
or Barbuda, fail to build DG uptake, despite DG 
readiness but succeed in producing DG impact. 
Second, the findings highlight diversity in the DG 
value chains within regional and economic groups. 
Third, the results confirm doubts about the diagnostic 
value of the EGDI Survey. Effectively, EDGI is mute 
on whether DG is developed optimally or contributes 
to improvements in public governance.  
As part of this study, we learned that evaluating 
countries’ DG performance through the value-based 
approach provides useful insights into how DG works. 
Existing data is imperfect, but additional indicators and 
intelligent rearrangement may reveal problems raised 
in literature as peculiarities of the existing benchmarks.  
This work may be beneficial to various groups of 
DG stakeholders. Researchers may refer to the DG 
value chain model as an alternative way of analyzing 
and explaining digital transformation mechanisms. 
Benchmark designers could find ideas on different 
ways of building their instruments. Policy-makers 
could learn whether and why certain countries manage 
to benefit from DG while others fail to do so and find 
analogies and useful lessons for their own countries.  
6. Conclusions  
In this study, we examined the countries’ DG 
performance from a different perspective than existing 
benchmarks. Instead of capturing the state of selected 
DG mechanisms, we captured how DG creates value 
holistically. To this end, we referred to the concept of 
the value chain and redesigned the existing schema of 
DG measurement to reflect the logic of this chain. The 
results revealed the most and the least successful 
countries in realizing the DG value chain, produced 
insights about the performance of such chains within 
geographic and economic groups, and compared such 
performance with the UN Survey findings. 
This research has some limitations. The first is the 
simplified nature of the DG value chain in our model, 
which balances theory-based conceptualizations and 
what existing benchmarking instruments have to offer. 
The second is quantifying DG stages and transitions 
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relative to the countries’ positions, not relative to 
external DG guidelines. Third, as the results refer to a 
particular period – 2014, 2016, and 2018 – they do not 
convey a sustained tendency. Fourth, while we 
examined the DG value chain performance against a 
list of factors, this list is not exhaustive.   
In the future, we plan to develop this model into a 
more comprehensive and reusable framework. We also 
plan to explore the literature and harness additional 
statistical techniques to build a useful toolset to help 
design and analyze DG value chains. 
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